Corporate Cash Balances, 1914-43: Manufacturing and Trade by Friedrich A. Lutz
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Corporate Cash Balances, 1914-43: Manufacturing and Trade





Chapter Title: The Liquidity Position of Manufacturing Corporations, World
War II
Chapter Author: Friedrich A. Lutz
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c4824
Chapter pages in book: (p. 72 - 84)THE LIQUIDITY POSITION OF
MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS,
WORLD WAR II
LIMITATiONS OF THE DATA
THE INTERPRETATION OF BALANCE SHEETS published by corpora-
tions during World War II presents difficulties which have to be
brought to light before an analysis of the present liquidity position
of corporations can be presented. Some of these difficulties concern
items of the balance sheet which do not play any role in the analysis
that follows and, therefore, need not be discussed here in detail.
That the "net income" shown in the balance sheet for war years
is a less reliable figure than the one for peacetime years, because
of renegotiation of contracts and other factors, is well known.
It is also common knowledge that a government-owned plant run
by a company is not among the assets of the company and, there-
fore, that the ratio of fixed property to other items of the balance
sheet is distorted.
The difficulties that arise in the interpretation of sales and cash
figures are perhaps less well known. Since our discussion is based
largely on these two items,1 the influence that the conditions under
which war production is carried on may have on these items needs
to be emphasized.
Sales result from the operation of the corporation's own plant
or of the government-owned plant. A few companies, in their
reports, give figures for sales under each type of ownership; others
do not.Some reports state explicitly that the published sales
figure excludes sales resulting from the operation of government-
owned plants. Other reports do not make any explicit statement,
but carry in "other income" an item, "fees arising from operation
•of government-owned facilities" or some similar descriptive title.
In this case, the plant is operated under a cost-pius-fixed-fee con-
1 The payments figure used throughout this study is derived from the sales figure.
(See Appendix C.)
72Liquidity Position, World War Ii 73
tract; it can then be assumed that the sales figure excludes sales
resulting from operation of the government-owned plant. In many
cases no hint is given at all. However, a reasonable assumption
is that, in the majority of cases, sales which result from the opera-
tion of plants that were leased to the corporations are included
in the company's sales figure as reported.
As for cash, company reports often mention a special deposit
"to be used exclusively on United States government contracts"
(or some similar caption). For the present study, this item has
been added to the other cash of the company. If a corporation
that runs a plant for the government includes the corresponding
sales in its reported sales figure, the ratio of cash to sales (or
payments, derived from sales)as computed here is unbiased,
since the cash balance includes cash required to operate the govern-
ment plant.In cases where cash necessary for the operation of
government plant is included in the cash shown in the balance
sheet but corresponding sales are not, the ratio would be too high.
Therefore, the ratio used in our analysis, if it is biased at all, is
biased in an upward direction.
POSTWAR RESERVES
Industrial concerns are acutely aware of the instability of present
conditions and many firms have considered it essential to make
some kind of financial provision for various contingencies arising
out of the war and, more especially, for the reconversion to peace-
time production.2This they have done by setting up special
reserves, usually out of current earnings.3 A survey by the Ameri-
can Institute of Accountants, based on 1941 fiscal year-end reports
of 429 large corporations in 15 manufacturing and trade groups,
shows that by the end of that year about one-fifth had established
contingency reserves of one type or another for postwar purposes.4
Tabulations of corporate annual reports for 1942, also made
2 The American Institute of Accountants took early cognizance of this problem and
in "Accounting for Special Reserves Arising Out of the War," Accounting Research
Bulletin, No. 13 (January 1942) discussed the many technical problems in connection
with accounting provision for postwar readjustment outlays.
3 In some cases sums that were previously classified under "surplus" (representing
past earnings) have been earmarked as reserves for contingencies; in such cases the
setting up of reserves clearly involves no change in the corporations' financial posi-
tions compared with what they were before the reserves were set up.
4 Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 74, No. 2 (August 1942)pp. 125-32.74 Corporate Cash Balances, 1914.43
by the Institute, indicate a considerable increase during the year
in the proportion of companies providing postwar reserves.5 A
detailed investigation of postwar reserves made by the Securities
and Exchange Commission and based on 250 selected companies
reveals that 146 companies by the end of 1942 had set up reserves
for war and postwar contingencies.6
Of the 45 corporations in our sample B,7 35 set up special re-
serves at one time or another after the end of 1939; some of these
reserves were later released, particularly in 1943. The reasons
for which reserves were set aside may be classified as follows:
1. Possible Decline in Values
Apart from protecting themselves against a decline in inventory
values by a change-over from the "first-in, first-out" method of
inventory valuation to the "last-in, first-out" method, many com-
panies set up special reserves against a possible decline. Under
the Contract Settlement Act of 1944, however, the danger of
losses on inventories is largely removed.
2. Postwar Conversion of Plant and Equipment
Under this heading are included the costs of rearranging and
adapting to postwar needs buildings and equipment now in use,
and the costs of reinstalling machines that were removed and
stored during the war. Also, in this classification, one corporation8
mentions carrying overhead costs during the period of readjust-
ment when current receipts will be low; and a corporation in the
aircraft industry9 refers to the development of non-aircraft prod-
ucts after the war.
3. Deferred Repairs and Maintenance
In some instances repairs and replacements that would have been
made in normal times have had to be postponed, partly because
of the necessity of keeping all machines continuously in operation,
and partly because new machines and parts of machines have not
been obtainable.In a few cases special reserve accounts have
5lbid., Vol. 76, No. 5 (November 1943) pp. 391-408.
6Securitiesand Exchange Commission, Report on Corporate War and Post-War
Reserves (Philadelphia, October 1943).
7Fora description of this sample see Appendix A.
8jCase, 34nnual Report for 1942.
9BoeingAircraft Company, ilnnual Report for 1942.Liquidity Position, World War II 75
been set up for repairs and maintenance, though provision has
more often been made through the normal medium of reserve
for depreciation and obsolescence.
4. Renegotiation of Government Contracts
Reserves under this heading are intended to provide for retro-
active readjustments of earnings that may arise during the war
through the government's downward adjustment of the prices it
has agreed to pay for deliveries of war materials.'0
5. Dismissal Compensation
Concerns are making provision for payments to employees during
the period of lay-off that is expected to occur while plant re-
adjustments are being made.
Many of the reserves are simply called "reserves for contin-
gencies," but inasmuch as they are evidently intended as a general
provision for one or more of the purposes indicated above, it is
fitting that they should be included in any statistical summation
of special war reserves. For our 45 corporations, the total of all
the sums allocated to reserves, which seem to be connected with
wartime or postwar adjustments, amounted to $275 million in
the period 1940-42; this sum was equivalent to 10 percent of the
corporations' net income(after taxes and before dividends)
during those years. By the end of 1943 the total amount of such
reserves was $406 million.
The primary function of the special reserves is that of an ac-
counting procedure which tries to make allowance for the lack of
precision of cost determination. Managements of corporations
rightly hold that in present circumstances, when the duration of
their operations along present lines and on their' present scale
cannot be predicted any more than the duration of the war itself,
the allocation of costs to specific fiscal periods of relatively short
length has become an even more difficult task than it was in
"normal" times.
A large part of the risk connected with the amortization of
10Thereis also considerable uncertainty connected with the cancellation of govern-
ment contracts which will take place when the war ends. Some such cancellation is
already occurring, and considerable business uncertainty is attached to these wartime
cancellations.76 Corporate Cash Balances, 1914.43
equipment for the production of war goods is being shouldered by
the government for emergency facilities. This has been done in
six ways: (a) Some of the plants and facilities are financed and
owned by the government through the Defense Plant Corporation
(a subsidiary of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation) which
leases them to the corporations operating them; (b) others are
financed by the corporations which operate them, but the govern-
ment contracts to buy them on sixty monthly instalments or upon
earlier termination of the contract; (c) some have been financed
as part of allowable costs under contract; (d) some plants and
facilities have been financed by the corporations, but they may be
amortized for tax purposes over sixty months; (e) some plants
are owned by the War and Navy Departments and are operated
either by them or by private corporations; (f) some are financed
by loans from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
Industrial corporations, however, will •have to face the costs
of actually converting plants to peacetime production, the possi-
bility that they may incur losses on their inventories, and the
necessity of carrying large overhead costs that are unmatched by
normal sales volume while the period of readjustment lasts. Cor-
poration managers are probably justified in representing these
costs as a charge against the income of the war period. There is
no precise way in which costs can be allocated to the operations
of individual years, since both the magnitude of the costs and
losses, and the length of the war and therefore of the period over
which they should be distributed, are uncertain.It is correspond-
ingly uncertain what part of any year's sales proceeds can be truly
considered as net income. Undoubtedly, corporations have created
"special reserves" out of current earnings to emphasize the lack
of finality of the figure declared as net income.1'
Additions to earned surplus, though they are not separated as a
distinct reserve labeled for a particular purpose, are not essentially
very different from special reserves. The important thing is
that the corporation retains earnings within the business and dis-
tributes that much less as dividends. For the 45corporationsthe
11 The suggestion has been made by accountants(see American Institute of
Accountants, Accounting Research Bulletin, No. 13, January 1942) that the use of
the term "net income" in profit and loss statements should be discontinued for the
duration of the war and the period of adjustment immediately afterward, and that
the final item shown should be "increase or decrease in earned surplus."Liquidity Position, World War II 77
proportion of retained earnings to net income as shown in the
balance sheets in the four years 1940-43 was 47.1 percent, com-
pared with 29.8 percent in the three years 1935-37.Retaining
income instead of paying it out in the form of current dividends
serves to build up a reserve against which the extraordinary costs
connected with conversion can later be charged. By setting up
special reserves and increasing the earned surplus, management
tends to avoid overstating income at present and understating it
in the immediate postwar years when earnings are, in any case,
likely to be lower than they are now.
In the present study, the question of particular interestis
whether or not it is true (as is widely believed) that the establish-
ment of these special reserves also performs a second function,
that of strengthening the liquidity of corporations.
LIQUIDITY POSITION OF MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION S
The composite balance sheet of the sample of 45 large manu-
facturing corporations yields no evidence, up to the end of 1943, of
any exceptionally heavy increase in holdings of cash. The actual
increase of cash was from $1,131 million at the end of 1939 to
$1,665 millionat the end of 1943 (Table 3). The percentage in-
crease (47) was less than that of the total means of payment (78)
in the same period.'2 Moreover, the ratio of cash to payments —
whichrelates cash to the work it has to do —actuallyfell from
12.3 percent in 1939 to 7.5 percent in 1943 (Table 4); the 1943
ratio was not much higher than that for 1937, the year in which
the ratio was the lowest of any time since 1929. Thus by neither
standard of comparison —i.e.,reference to the total means of
payment or reference to the volume of corporate transactions —
doesthe increase in cash holdings of this sample appear to be
abnormally high. Therefore, on the basis of the corporations'
cash position alone, the argument that their liquidity position has
been strengthened considerably is not justified. This conclusion is
contrary to a widespread belief, which obviously is based on the
observation that the actual increase in the cash balance of corpora-
tions has been substantial.
12Italso was far below the percentage increase in cash for all corporations. The
Securities and Eichange Commission estimates that the cash of all corporations more
than doubled in the period between the end of 1939 and 1943.78 Corporate Cash Balances, 1914.43





hem 1939 1943 crease, 1939-43
Cash $1,131 $1,665 $534
Marketable securities 403 1,798 1,395
(tax notes) (605) (605)
Receivables 853 2,098 1,245
Inventories 2,303 3,298 995
Total current assets 4,690 8,859 4,169
Fixed assets b 5,483 5,358 125
Investments 1,269 1,215 —54
Other assets 345 664- 319
TOTAL ASSETS 11,787 16,096 4,309
Liabilities
Notes payable 75 167 92
Accounts payable 420 946 526
Other current liabilities 490 2,859 2,369
(tax liabilities) (279) (1,727) (1,44.8)
Total current liabilities 985 3,972 2,987
Long-term debt 1,335 1,264 —71
Other liabilities 400 429 29
Capital stock 5,739 5,641 —98
Surplus 2,910 3,866 956
Reserves 418 924 506
(special war reserves) (406) (406)
TOTAL LIABILITIES 11,787 16,096 4,309
Sales 8,933 20,366 11,433
Net income 699 795 96
Cash dividends 532 513 —19
Depreciation charges 482 627 145
aFora description of the sample see Appendix A.
b Net of depreciation reserves.
Our earlier analysis, however, has shown clearly that an at-
tempt to measure the liquidity of corporations cannot be confined
to consideration of their cash liquidity alone.If only the cash
balance is taken into account, a distorted result is obtained; forLiquidity Position, World War II 79
instance, if the year end occurs immediately after a war bond
drive has been concluded, the cash balance will be relatively low,
and, therefore, the ratio of cash to payments will be low; the
reverse will be true if the year end falls in a period just preceding
a war bond drive. For this reason, marketable securities must
be included in our analysis. Such securities can be considered as
good as cash, not only from the standpoint of an individual cor-
poration but also from the standpoint of all corporations together,
since liquidation of the securities is unlikely to cause a sharp drop
in their prices for the following reasons: First, corporations can
use part of the securities (especially tax notes) to make tax pay-
ments, an offset which is equivalent to a release of cash. Second,
large amounts of government securities are short-term and bring
in cash automatically, so there is no necessity to sell them. Third,
if corporations should begin to sell the longer-term bonds, it is
highly possible that the monetary authorities would support the
market if it should show a tendency to sag.
Although, as indicated in Table 4, the ratio of cash plus market-
able securities to payments in 1943 (14.9 percent) was lower than
in 1939 (16.2 percent), it was considerably above the 1937 ratio
(10.0 percent), which was the lowest in the whole interwar
Table 4—LIQUIDITY POSITION OF SAMPLE B OF LARGE
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1937 $ 798 $ 304 $11,072 7.2% 10.0%
1938 897 282 8,320 10.8 14.2
1939 1,095 344 8,880 12.3 16.2
1940 1,285 407 9,911 13.0 17.1
1941 1,407 673 13,779 10.2 15.1
1942 1,387 1,075 16,627 8.3 14.8
1943 1,533 1,507 20,401 7.5 14.9
a Fora description of the sample see Appendix A.
b Average of two successive year-end figures.
CRatioof average cash of two successive year ends to total payments in the year
between the two dates.
d Ratio of average cash plus average marketable securities of two successive year
ends to total payments in the year between the two dates.80 Corporate Cash Balances, 1914-43
period.13 On this basis,it may be said that corporations have
actually decreased their since 1939, but that they have a
considerable amount of "excess" liquidity upon which to draw
even if they no longer have much "free" cash.If the minimum
requirements for liquid funds of corporations are estimated for
1943 by applying to the payments figure for that year the 1937
ratio of cash plus marketable securities to payments, it is found
that in 1943 cash plus marketable securities exceeded the minimum
requirements by $1,000 million.14 This amount in excess of mini-
mum needs constitutes, on this basis of comparison, "free" liquid
funds in 1943.Since the ratio of liquid funds to payments for
1937 is the lowest of any year in the interwar period, this figure of
$1,000 million would have to be regarded as the upper limit for
"free" funds in 1943.
However, certain new factors which made themselves felt in
1943 but were absent or less important in 1937 make it more than
doubtful that these $1,000 million can be readily considered as
"free" funds. These factors are such that they force companies
to hold a larger percentage of liquid funds to payments than in
prewar years; in other words, it is uncertain what part of this
"excess" liquidity is really excess in the sense that companies have
free funds above those required to provide liquidity for expected
payments. The factors necessitating a higher ratio of liquid funds
to payments include the high tax liability in 1943 against which
liquid funds must be held; the possibility that retroactive rises of
wage rates may be necessary, with which companies have to
reckon; the fact that payments by government agencies are often
made in the form of an advance of money which can be used only
for the execution of the war contracts for which the advance is
made; and the probability that concerns will have to make lump
13 Chart 17 shows that the ratio of cash to current liabilities, the ratio of cash plus
marketable securities to current liabilities, the "quick" ratio, and the ratio of current
assets to current liabilities in 1943 were below their 1937 levels, a fact that contrasts
sharply wth the result obtained when the liquidity of corporations is measured by the
ratio of cash plus marketable securities to total payments. The difference isac-
counted for by the fact that current liabilities have risen faster than payments since
1937. This in turn is due to the increase in the proportion of current liabilities repre-
sented by tax liabilities, which now account for almost one-half of total current
liabilities.
14 The year 1937 recommends itself as a basis for comparison not only because it
shows the lowest ratio of cash to payments in the interwar period but also because it
was, on the whole, a prosperous year and because it is relatively near to the present.Liquidity Position, World War ii 81
sum payments to government agencies as the result of the re-
negotiation procedures.'5 The most important of these factors
is the tax liability, the influence of which will now be discussed
in greater detail.
It may be contended that special account does not have to be
taken of tax liabilities, since tax payments are included in our
payments figure and liquid funds held against the tax liability are
in our figure for cash and marketable securities. This contention
is not justified, however. Prudent management considers it nec-
essary to cover alV° or a large part of tax liabilities in the form
of liquid funds; that is, tax liabilities require holdings of liquid
funds which are much higher in relation to the payments to which
they give rise than are the holdings of liquid funds required to
provide for other payments. Then, part or all of the "excess"
liquidity calculated on the basis of the 1937 ratio of liquid funds
to payments may be actually tied up by the tax liability and is not
"excess" at all.
In 1943 the companiesour sample estimated that they owed
the government by way of tax liability $1,727 million; they them-
selves were, on account of their holding of tax notes and govern-
ment securities, creditors of the government to the extent of
approximately $1,800 million.'7If(on the assumption that
companies deem it necessary to cover tax liabilities 100 percent by
liquid funds) all taxes as estimated by the companies for 1943 are
excluded from our payment figure for this year, and tax liabilities
are correspondingly excluded from our figures for liquid funds,18
and if the average ratio of the remaining liquid funds to the
remaining payments is computed, the ratio is found to be 7.7
percent for 1943, a figure lower than the ratio of total liquid
funds to total payments in 1937 (10.0 percent). If it is assumed
15Awar contractor whose profits have been reduced by renegotiation takes credit
for the taxes he has already paid. The contractor pays only the net difference be-
tween the refund payable to the government agency and the taxes already paid.
16Somecritics of the first draft of this study pointed out to the author that prudent
management considers it necessary to cover tax liabilities 100 percent by liquid funds.
17Marketablesecurities also include nongovernment securities. However, the de-
ductions to be made from marketable securities on this account are of relatively
minor importance.
18Asum equal to the tax liabilities in the year-end balance sheet of 1942 is de-
ducted from the liqui4 funds for this same date and correspondingly for the year-
end balance sheet for 1943; the average of the remaining liquid funds is related to
the payments during 1943 diminished by the tax liabilities as estimated for 1943.82 Corporate Cash Balances, 1914.43
that only 50 percent of tax liabilities has to be covered by liquid
funds,19 the ratio of liquid funds to payments (after deducting
50 percent of the tax liabilities from the figures for liquid funds
and the tax liabilities for 1943 from the figure for payments) is
12.0 percent for 1943. While it is true that the 1937 ratio may be
too high for purposes of comparison (since the influence of tax
liabilities on holdings of liquid funds cannot be eliminated for
that year because of the lack of tax liability figures), the error
cannot be very large, since the tax liability in 1937 was of minor
importance compared with 1943. Taking into account that the
ratio of liquid funds to payments in 1937 is the lowest ratio in
the interwar period and, furthermore, that other factors, some
of which were mentioned above (possibility of retroactive wage
rise, advances from the government on special war contracts),
tied up additional liquid funds, the 1943 liquid funds do not
appear to be more than sufficient to provide the amount of
liquidity that prudent management would consider necessary in
view of the payments that could reasonably be expected.2°
Whether or not an analysis of the medium-sized and small
manufacturing corporations will lead to the same result is a point
of interest. The data for our sample of these companies are less
satisfactory for our purposes than are those for large manufac-
turing corporations, since figures for medium-sized and small
companies are available only to the end of 1942 and holdings of
marketable securities are not reported separately in the balance
sheet but are included in the item, "investments." Because of these
deficiencies of our sample, the following discussion is based on a
different sample of the same size-group of corporations, a sample
which has the advantage of comprising 832 manufacturing cor-
19 Tax notes alone in 1943 were 41.2 percent of tax liabilities.
20 There is one factor which in 1943 may have made itself felt in the opposite direc-
tion. The turnover of inventories was considerably higher in that year than in 1937.
It is true that this situation does not affect the amount of liquid funds required for
the transaction purpose proper: Two companies which have the same receipts and
expenditures, spread continuously through time, have the same degree of coincidence
of receipts and expenditures and therefore need the same amount of liquid funds
for the transaction purpose (see Chapter 4, p. 37), no matter what their respective
ratios of inventory turnover are. But in so far as the more rapid turnover of inven-
tories signifies a greater liquidity of inventories the companies may consider it pos-
sible to get along with a smaller amount of cash or marketable securities held for
precautionary reasons (see Chapter 4, p. 39). A company may therefore feel justi-
fled in reducing the total amount of cash plus marketable securities held to provide
for expected and unexpected payments.Liquidity Position, World War II 83
Table 5—LIQUIDITY POSITION OF MEDIUM-SIZED AND
SMALL MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS, 1940-43a


















1940 $ 71.0 $ 10.2 .. .. ..
1941 * 88.4 20.7 $2,048.2 3.9% 4.6%
1942 146.5 81.0 2,659.2 4.4 6.3
1943 217.9 178.4 3,242.4 5.6 9.6
a Sample of 832 corporations, from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.
b Ratio of average cash of two successive year ends to total sales in the year be-
tween the two dates.
CRatioof average cash plus marketable securities of two successive year ends to
total sales in the year between the two dates.
porations.2' The figures are, however, available only since 1940,
which precludes a comparison with prewar years.
Cash holdings of this sample of companies at the end of 1943
were 206 percent above those at the end of 1940 (Table 5).
Totalmeans of payment in the same period rose only 60 percent
and cash balances of our sample of large manufacturing corpora-
tions (sample B) only 16 percent. Thus while the increase in
cash holdings of the large corporations lagged considerably behind
the increase in the total means of payment, the increase in cash
holdings of medium and small corporations far exceeded it. Other
samples based on a smaller number of companies in the medium
and small size group of corporations also show that the increase
in cash for this group is far greater than that of the total means
of payment. Exceptionally large accumulations of cash appear to
be characteristic of medium-sized and small manufacturing cor-
porations but not of large.
Not only the absolute volume of cash for the medium and small
companies but also the ratio of average cash to sales (which are
a good substitute for payments) shows a substantial increase. The
21Datafor the sample were put at the disposal of the Financial Research Program
by the courtesy of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.84 CorporateCashBalances,1914.43
ratio rose from 3.9 percent in 1941 to 5.6percentin 1943, in
contrast to the group of large corporations whose ratio declined
during the same period.
If account is taken of marketable securities, the liquidity posi-
tion of the medium-sized and small corporations appears still more
favorable. Marketable securities for this sample of 832 manu-
facturing corporations increased more than seventeen times be.
tween the end of 1940 and 1943. The ratio of average cash plus
marketable securities to sales rose from 4.6 percent to 9.6 percent.
between 1941 and 1943 whereas the corresponding ratio for large
manufacturing corporations was lower in 1943 than in1941
(Table 4). Even if all tax liabilities are deducted from the sales
figures (which have to be taken as representing the payment figures
for the medium-sized and small group) and also from the figures
for liquid funds, the ratio still indicates a definite improvement in
the liquidity position of medium-sized and small corporations dur-
ing the war period.
SUMMARY
(1) The increase in cash of large manufacturing corporations which has
taken place since 1939 does not constitute an increase in liquidity since
the volume of payments has risen more than cash.Medium-sized and
small manufacturing corporations, on the other hand, show a much more
rapid increase in cash than in payments. Their cash liquidity, there-
fore, has increased.
(2)If marketable securities are taken into account, the liquidity of large
corporations, as measured by the ratio of cash plus marketable securities
to payments, is higher than in 1937. However, this higher ratio does
not signify "free" liquid funds, since corporations have to hold larger
cash balances for their expected payments than was the case before the
war.
(3) The ratio of average cash plus marketable securities to sales of medium-
sized and small corporations shows a substantial increase since .1941.
Their liquidity position has improved definitely during the war years
and is in sharp contrast to that of the large corporations.
I